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stating that
[t]he appropriate sanction in a civil contempt case is an order that
incarcerates a contemner for an indefinite term and that also
specifies a reasonable manner in which the contempt may be
purged thereby securing the immediate release of the contemner,
or an order requiring the payment of a fine in the nature of
compensation or damages to the party aggrieved by the failure of
the contemner to comply with the order. 4
Finally in Robinson, Justice McHugh held that
[a]bsent legislation otherwise, the public interest in the
enforcement of a noncustodial parent's obligation of support does
not create a positive duty on the part of a prosecuting attorney to
prosecute a civil contempt action which arises from a failure to
comply with a divorce decree which orders support payments.7 5
B.

Criminal Contempt

In State ex rel. Robinson v. Michael,1 6 Justice McHugh indicated that
"[w]here the purpose to be served by imposing a sanction for contempt is to punish
the contemner for an affront to the dignity or authority of the court, or to preserve
71 7
or restore order in the court or respect for the court, the contempt is criminal.
Justice McHugh also held that "[t]he appropriate sanction in a criminal
contempt case is an order sentencing the contemner to a definite term of
imprisonment or an order requiring the contemner to pay a fine in a determined
amount. ,718
XII. CONTRACT LAW

A.

Interpreting Contract

In L.D.A., Inc. v. Cross,71 9 Justice McHugh restated a principle of law
developed in Quinn v. Beverages of West Virginia.720 He held in Cross:

714

Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.

715

Id. at Syl. Pt. 6.
276 S.E.2d 812 (W. Va. 1981).

716
717

Id. at Syl. Pt. 4.

718

Id. at Syl. Pt. 5.

719

279 S.E.2d 409 (W. Va. 1981).

720

224 S.E.2d 894 (W. Va. 1976).
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Whether a contract is entire or severable is a determination to be
made by the court according to the intention of the parties and
such intention shall be ascertained from a consideration of the
subject matter of the contract, a reasonable construction of the
terms thereof and the conduct of the parties during their
negotiations, all of which should be viewed in the light of the
surrounding circumstances. 72'

B.

Novation

In Perlick & Co. v. Lakeview Creditor's Trustee Committee,722 Justice
McHugh defined and set out the elements of a novation. He held:
Novation is generally defined as a mutual agreement among all
parties concerned for discharge of a valid existing obligation by
the substitution of a new binding obligation on the part of the
debtor or another. Thus, the necessary elements of a novation are
(a) a previous valid obligation, (b) a consent by all parties td the
new contract, (c) an abatement of the old contract and (d) a new
contract which is valid and enforceable. Without any of these
essential elements, there is no novation. 23
C.

Assignment

Justice McHugh held in Clendenin Lumber & Supply Co. v. Carpenter 24
that "[t]he phrase 'to another' as used in the definition of an assignment of earnings
under W.Va. Code 46A-2-116(2)(b) [1974], 725includes an employer when that
employer is also the creditor of the employee."
D.

Mechanic's Lien
In Dunlap v. Hinkle726 Justice McHugh relied upon the decision in Lilly v.
order to hold:

Munsey7 27 in

A mechanic's lien for supplies and labor used and employed in the
improvement of real estate, to bind the interest of the owner of
721

279 S.E.2d at Syl.

722

298 S.E.2d 228 (W. Va. 1982).

723

hM at Syl. Pt. 2.

724

305 S.E.2d 832 (W. Va. 1983).

725

Id. at Syl. Pt. 1.

726

317 S.E.2d 508 (W. Va. 1984).

727

63 S.E.2d 519 (W. Va. 1951).
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such real estate, or any interest therein, must be based on contract
for such improvement with such owner, of said real estate or
interest therein, or his duly authorized agent. 28
E.

Oral Contract

Justice McHugh ruled in Lorenze v. Church729 that "[a] person whose
rights, status, or other legal relations are affected by an oral contract may obtain a
declaration of those
rights, status, or other legal relations under W.Va. Code,
73

55-13-2 [1941 ].,,0
F.

Oil and Gas Lease

In Berry Energy Consultants & Managers, Inc. v. Bennett,73 ' Justice
McHugh was concerned with rights of a lessor and lessee regarding property leased
for oil and gas. Justice McHugh held:
Under the provisions of W.Va. Code, 36-4-9a [1979], a
"rebuttable legal presumption" that a lessee intends to abandon an
oil and/or gas well shall not be created, where the lessee has paid
or tendered "delay rental" for the leased premises. Where,
however, a lessor and a lessee have entered into a lease for the
purpose of "exploring and operating for" and "producing and
marketing" oil and gas, and a well has been drilled by the lessee
and gas discovered, the payment or tender by the lessee of delay
rental for the leased premises does not relieve the lessee from an
implied obligation to exercise reasonable diligence in marketing
gas from the leased premises. 732
Justice McHugh addressed several issues involving an oil and gas lease in
McCullough Oil, Inc. v. Rezek. 733 The court held initially:
An oil and gas lease (or other mineral lease) is both a conveyance
and a contract. It is designed to accomplish the main purpose of
the owner of the land and of the lessee (or its assignee) as operator
of the oil and gas interests: securing production of oil or gas or
both in paying quantities, quickly and for as long as production in
728

Id. at Syl. Pt. 1.

729

305 S.E.2d 326 (W. Va. 1983).

730
731

Id. at Syl. Pt. 1.
331 S.E.2d 823 (W. Va. 1985).

732

Id. at Syl. Pt 2.

733

346 S.E.2d 788 (W. Va. 1986).
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paying quantifies is obtainable.7'
Justice McHugh next held:
A habendum clause in an oil and gas lease (or other mineral lease)
providing for a short primary term and a secondary term for "so
long as" production in paying quantities or operations therefor
continue, or similar language, conveys a "determinable" interest,
that is, an interest subject to a special limitation. Such an interest
automatically terminates by its own terms upon the occurrence of
the stated event, namely, expiration of the primary term without
production or operations at such time, or the cessation of
production or operations during the secondary term. 7
Continuing in McCullough Oil Justice McHugh ruled:
Where an oil and gas lease (or other mineral lease) contains a
cessation of production clause applicable to the secondary term,
the lease terminates automatically at the end of the "grace period"
provided by such clause, unless production or operations are
resumed within the grace period. The cessation of production
within the
clause grants the lessee the right to resume operations
736
grace period; it does not impose the duty to do so.
Justice McHugh concluded in McCullough Oil by holding that "[t]he
lessee (or its assignee as operator) is not entitled to notice before the lease
terminates automatically under the habendum clause or the cessation of production
clause of an oil and gas lease (or other mineral lease)." 737
In Bruen v. Columbia Gas Transmission Corp., 38 Justice McHugh
construed language in an oil and gas lease. The decision stated:
If an oil and gas lease contains a clause to continue the lease for a
term "so long thereafter as oil or gas is produced," but also
provides for "flat-rate" rental payments, then quantity of
production is not relevant to the expiration of the term of the lease
if such "flat-rate" rental payments have been made by the lessee.
Therefore, in a case involving termination of such an oil and gas
lease which provides "flat-rate" rental payments, it is reversible
error for a circuit court to instruct the jury that the word
734

l

735

Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.

736

Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.

737

Id. at Syl. Pt. 4.

738

426 S.E.2d 522 (W. Va. 1992).

at Syl. Pt. 1.
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"produced" in
quantities." 739
G.

the

lease

means

"produced

[V/ol. 102

in

paying

PerfectedSecurity Interest

In Daniel v. Stevens,740 Justice McHugh addressed issues under the
Uniform Commercial Code pertaining to security interests. The court held:
Equitable estoppel is not a legally cognizable defense to avoid a
prior perfected security interest in collateral, where the subsequent
creditor or purchaser claims the equitable estoppel based upon an
alleged representation by the prior secured party that its security
interest had been terminated or released, but where the subsequent
creditor or purchaser has not utilized available and convenient
means of assuring priority, specifically, waiting until after a
termination statement or a written release has been filed, pursuant
to W.Va. Code, 46-9-404, as amended, or W.Va. Code, 46-9-406,

as amended, respectively, before acquiring an interest in the
collateral from the debtor.74'
In Daniel,Justice McHugh also held:
The husband's signature on the financing statement as a "debtor"
is sufficient notice to interested persons that the secured party has
a valid security interest in the listed collateral to the extent of the
husband's ownership interest therein, even if the wife is a
co-owner of the collateral and a co-debtor and she has not signed
the financing statement. In those circumstances interested persons
cannot successfully claim the total invalidity of the security
interest based upon the allegation or the fact that the wife did not
sign the financing statement as another "debtor," as required by
W.Va. Code, 46-9-402(1), as amended.7 42
H.

ParolEvidence Rule
Justice McHugh stated succinctly in Haymaker v. General Tire Inc.74 that

"[t]he parol evidence rule may not be invoked by a stranger to a release. "744
739

Id. at Syl.

740

394 S.E.2d 79 (W. Va. 1990).

741

Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.

742

Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.

743

420 S.E.2d 292 (W. Va. 1992).

7/44

id. at Syl.
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Liquidated Damages Clause
Justice McHugh wrote in Wheeling Clinic v. Van Pelt745 that
[i]n determining whether a clause in a contract stating a sum to be
paid in the event of a breach of the contract is liquidated damages
or a penalty, the important question is not the intention of the
parties but rather the reasonableness in fact of the agreed sum
when the contract was made.746

J.

PromissoryNote

Justice McHugh held in Young v. Sodaro74 that "[u]nder the rule of
perfect tender in time, a debtor, absent statutory authority or contractual language
to the contrary, has no right to prepay a promissory note secured by a deed of trust
prior to the date of maturity." 748
XIII. CIVIL RIGHTS
A.

JudicialReview ofDecision by Human Rights Commission

In State ex rel. State of West Virginia Human Rights Commission v.
Logan-Mingo Area Mental HealthAgency, Inc.,749 Justice McHugh held:
A determination, by the West Virginia Human Rights
Commission, that an employer has accorded disparate treatment to
members of different races, is a finding of fact which may not be
reversed by a circuit court upon review, unless such finding is
clearly wrong in view of the reliable, probative and substantial
evidence on the whole record.750
B.

Sufficiency ofAdministrative Complaint

Justice McHugh addressed several issues concerning prerequisites of a
discrimination complaint filed with the Human Rights Commission in the case of

745

453 S.E.2d 603 (W. Va. 1994).

746

IR. at Syl. Pt. 5.

747

748

456 S.E.2d 31 (W. Va. 1995).
Id. at Syl.

749

329 S.E.2d 77 (W. Va. 1985).

750

ITMat Syl. Pt. 5.
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